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NOTES
JUDICIAL LEGERDEIAIN: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 PULLED
FROM MIRANDA'S HAT
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 1973, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, in United States v. Vigo,' reversed a district court decision to suppress
a confession given after inadequate Miranda warnings had been administered.
This result pointed up once again the conflict between the Supreme Court ruling
in Miranda v. Arizona,2 and section 701(a) of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970).3
As Judge Timbers noted in his dissent in Vigo, the Second Circuit therein "[re-
turned] to the pre-Miranda test of voluntariness," thus "[validating], sub
silentio, Title II of the ...Act." 4 This result, contrary to the majority's ex-
pressed intent to decline consideration of the application and constitutionality of
section 3501,5 goes a long way toward eroding the once-powerful effect of the
Miranda decision. It is the purpose of this Note to examine this constitutional
conflict, evaluating its effect upon the law on admissibility of confessions, both
in light of United States v. Vigo and in terms of future action by the Supreme
Court.
II. Miranda v. Arizona
In this landmark decision the Supreme Court expanded the protection afforded
defendants involved in the process of police interrogation which had been required
by Escobedo v. Illinois.6 Prior to Miranda, admissibility of confessions was deter-
mined under the due process clause by a voluntariness test. The courts regarded
many different factors including reliability, fairness, and capacity to choose.Y All
circumstances of a confession or statement had to be considered by the court to
determine whether or not the defendant was in control of his will at the time he
confessed.8
In Escobedo, the Supreme Court held that, under the sixth amendment as ap-
plied to the states by the fourteenth amendment, questioning of a defendant
could not take place without counsel once "the process shifts from investigatory
1. No. 73-1133 (2d Cir., Sept. 11, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Vigo Slip Opinion].
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Hereinafter referred to as section 3501.
4. Vigo Slip Opinion 5089 (Timbers, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
5. Id. at 5088 (majority opinion).
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. MAiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507-08 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See Gallegos
v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
8. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1961).
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to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a con-
fession-our adversary system begins to operate . . .... , The Miranda Court
sought to formulate "a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of
the interrogation.' 10 It noted that:
[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work
to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit
a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must
be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights
must be fully honored."
While there can be no reasonable disagreement with the rationale underlying
Miranda, problems do arise with the Court's conclusion that in-custody inter-
rogation is necessarily coercive.' 2 Hence, it is not surprising that this finding
provides a major target for the attacks on the Miranda decision.13 The Supreme
Court in Miranda determined that most in-custody questioning is conducted in
secrecy, making it difficult to recapture what took place during interrogation.14
The Court, therefore, based its findings on various manuals used by the police in
training and practice. 5 Having decided long before Miranda that physical abuse
9. 378 U.S. at 492. Criticism of Escobedo, based upon the claim that interrogation is not
a proceeding under the sixth amendment which requires right to counsel, was undercut by the
Court's reliance in Miranda upon the fifth amendment. See Eisen & Rosett, Protections for
the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 645, 664 (1967). It is difficult to
tell, however, whether or to what extent an independent right to counsel founded on the sixth
amendment has survived Miranda. Id. at 665. This problem was discussed in United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1967).
10. 384 U.S. at 465.
11. Id. at 467. To assure the protection of these rights the Court formulated the following
requirements: 1. A defendant in custody must be warned prior to interrogation that he has
(a) the right to remain silent, and that anything he says may be used against him in court,
(b) the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during interrogation,
and (c) the right to appointed counsel if he is indigent; 2. Any indication by such a defen-
dant, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, must result in the
cessation of questioning; 3. Any indication that such a defendant wants counsel present dur-
ing questioning must result in suspension of questioning until his attorney is present; 4. State-
ments resulting from in-custody interrogation will be admissible if a knowing and willing
waiver of the above rights is shown. Id. at 467-79.
12. Compare Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
42 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Driver] with Justice White's dissent in Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 533-34.
13. See Note, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act: A Study in Constitutional Con-
flict, 57 Geo. L.J. 438, 443-44 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Title II Note]. The argument is
that if the factual determination that in-custody interrogation is necessarily coercive is incor-
rect, then there is no need for the protection provided by the Miranda warnings to preserve
the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 448-49.
14. 384 U.S. at 445.
15. Id. at 448 & n.8.
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automatically proved involuntariness,' 6 it was not difficult for the Court to con-
clude that psychological manipulation was also a great threat to voluntary action
by a defendant, and therefore required some control. It is questionable, however,
whether the warnings required by Miranda are sufficiently effective to guard
against this abuse.1 7 Under the voluntariness test in effect before Miranda, the
court made its own examination of the record to determine whether or not there
had been physical or mental coercion.' Under Miranda, a court is still required
to do this, but it will suppress a confession "unless [the prosecution] demon-
strates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination."' 19 The procedural safeguards were the warnings set forth in
Miranda.2° The voluntariness test still applies in determining whether a defen-
dant's waiver of the fifth amendment privilege "is made voluntarily, knowingly
and intelligently."'"
The Miranda decision was greeted with mixed reactions. Civil libertarians
hailed it, while those associated with law enforcement denounced it for effectively
handcuffing the police in their work.22 An increasing crime rate made the latter
viewpoint the more popular. 23 One result of the protests provoked by Miranda
and various other defendants' rights decisions2 was congressional reaction cul-
minating in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 . -
III. SECTION 3501
The purpose of section 3501 was, in part, to overrule Miranda. Congress found
that decision to have demoralized law enforcement officials by mandating the
release of criminals whose guilt was almost a certainty.26 The decisions in
16. Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1967) (per curiam) ; see Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 280-82, 286 (1936).
17. Driver 59-61. See also Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation
of Miranda, 47 Denver L.J. 1, 21-26 (1970).
18. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 561-62 (1958). See notes 7-8 supra.
19. 384 U.S. at 444.
20. See note 11 supra.
21. 384 U.S. at 444. "[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of
the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact
eventually obtained." Id. at 475.
22. Edwards, The Effects of "Miranda" on the Work of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 159, 160-61 (1967). See also F. Graham, The Self-Inflicted Wound
6-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Graham].
23. See, e.g., Ervin, Miranda v. Arizona: A Decision Based on Excessive and Visionary
Solicitude For the Accused, 5 Am. Crim. L.Q. 125 (1967). See also Graham 6-9.
24. E.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943).
25. Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections
of 5, 18, 28, 42 & 47 U.S.C. (1970)).
26. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Report]. It
was also intended to overrule the McNabb-Mtfallory rule requiring an appearance before a
magistrate by an arrested person without unnecessary delay, which rule was used to exclude
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Miranda and Escobedo were characterized by the Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary as "technical roadblocks thrown up by the Court. ' 27 The committee report
further stated that "[t]he general public is becoming frightened and angered by
the many reports of depraved criminals being released to roam the streets in
search of other victims."
'28
Section 3501 provides that any confession "voluntarily given" is admissible. 2
It modifies Miranda by providing that whether various enumerated factors-
which include time elapsing between arrest and arraignment, knowledge of the
charge, knowledge of the right to remain silent, knowledge that any statement
can be used against the defendant, and advice of the right to counsel and to
assistance of counsel when questioned-are present or not "need not be conclu-
sive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession."3 0 Thus, the statute states
that warnings apparently found by the Supreme Court to be constitutionally re-
quired need not necessarily be given before a confession will be admissible.
Debate as to the constitutionality of section 3501 was reflected in the report
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.31 The minority pointed out that the
police interrogation and eyewitness testimony provisions of title II "are so
squarely in conflict with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the Miranda
and Wade cases that they will almost certainly be declared unconstitutional as
soon as they are tested in the courts."3 2 It further stated that: "The Supreme
confessions obtained during such delays. See id. at 38-41. See also Mallory v. United States,
354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
27. Report 41.
28. Id. For studies of the effect of Miranda on law enforcement see, e.g., 0. Stephens,
The Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt 165-200 (1973); Edwards, The Effects of
"Miranda" on the Work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, S Am. Crim. L.Q. 159 (1967);
Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1347 (1968); Milner, Comparative Analy-
sis of Patterns of Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions, 5 Law & Soc'y Rev. 119 (1970) ;
Seeburger & Wettick, Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1
(1967); Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 Yale L.J. 1519
(1967). None of these studies indicates that the reports frightening the public were founded
in fact. See Graham 276-92.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1970).
30. Id. § 3501(b) (1970). The text of this section is as follows:
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration
all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing
between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after
arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confes-
sion, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to
make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or
not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into considera-
tion by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
31. Report, supra note 26.
32. Id. at 147.
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Court made clear in the Miranda opinion that its holding was firmly grounded
on a constitutional basis that no legislature could overrule. '
The majority apparently relied on the following language in the Miranda
opinion for support:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their
creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say that the Constitution neces-
sarily requires adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of
the interrogation process as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates
a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it
intended to have this effect. We encourage Congress and the States to continue their
laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of
their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the...
safeguards must be observed. 34
The claim of constitutionality was based upon the fact-gathering powers Congress
used to formulate the standards in section 3501.25 The argument was that tes-
timony before the Judiciary Committee indicated that the "custodial interroga-
tion-inherent coercion" premise, upon which the Supreme Court based the need
for warnings, was incorrect, and that, therefore, the warnings themselves were
not required to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 0 This argument,
relying on Katzenbach v. Morgan,3 7 is a weak one. In Katzenbach, the Supreme
Court ruled that Congress had the power under the enabling clause of the four-
teenth amendment to pass laws which would enforce the prohibitions of the equal
protection clause 38 A judicial determination that enforcement of a state law,
precluded by an act of Congress, violated the fourteenth amendment was held to
be unnecessary. 9 The Court was careful to note, however, that Congress does not
have the power to enact legislation which dilutes equal protection and due process
decisions of the Court.40 It would seem, therefore, that since the Court in Miranda
clearly intended to increase protections for the defendant beyond the voluntari-
ness test,4 1 the effort by Congress to constrict defendants' rights by returning to
that test would not survive close scrutiny under Katzenbach. 2
33. Id. at 149.
34. 384 U.S. at 467 (emphasis added).
35. Report 47.
36. Id. at 60-63. See also Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 81; Title II Note 444-46.
37. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
38. Id. at 648.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 651 n.10. There is no reason to believe that the Court would not also include
under this limiting footnote its decisions under the fourteenth amendment protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination, ie., Miranda.
41. 384 U.S. at 467.
42. See Title II Note 446.
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It appears that title II was enacted as a result of blind reliance upon the ex-
plicit invitation to Congress and the States to develop their own procedures to
protect the privilege expressed by the Court in Miranda.43 However, in adopting
section 3501, the legislators overlooked the qualification placed upon that invita-
tion by the Court that the substitute safeguards must be "fully as effective as
those [of Miranda] in informing accused persons of their right of silence and in
affording a continuous- opportunity to exercise it."'44
The uncertain constitutionality of section 350145 has led to a reluctance on the
part of lower federal courts to confront the question.46 This hesitancy has created
problems as alluded to in United States v. Vigo.
IV. United States v. Vigo
Defendant Vigo was arrested at about 1:00 a.m., on April 13, 1972, while
driving a car which carried three others. The four were removed from the car,
placed under arrest, and told of the offense for which they were being arrested.
The arrest was effectuated by six agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs on the basis of both information supplied by an informant and
surveillance conduced by the agents. A frisking of Vigo disclosed a loaded re-
volver tucked in his belt, and a search of the car uncovered a briefcase in the
trunk containing heroin as well as narcotics paraphernalia. After this discovery,
an agent "advised Vigo that '... he had a right to have an attorney, had a right
not to say anything at all, that he had a right to have an attorney present dur-
ing anything we might discuss, if he wanted to discuss anything, and advised
him he had the right to have a court-appointed attorney if he so desired and
could not afford his own attorney.' ,4 The agent did not remember telling Vigo
that anything he said could later be used against him.
At this point Vigo expressed a willingness to talk and, during a discussion with
the agent, admitted that one of the packages contained heroin and belonged to
him. He explained that two of his companions knew nothing about the heroin
and that the third, Miss Pagan, was not responsible for the heroin, although she
knew of its existence.48
The district court, per Judge Motley, suppressed these statements relying upon
both Miranda and section 3501. 49 The government appealed under 18 U.S.C.
43. See 384 U.S. at 490; text accompanying note 34 supra.
44. 384 U.S. at 490.
45. For discussions of the constitutionality of section 3501, in addition to those already
cited, see B. George, Constitutional Limitations on Evidence in Criminal Cases 318-19 (1973) ;
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 826a, at 438-41 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); 1 C. Wright, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure (Criminal) § 76, at 120-22 (1969) ; 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1392 (1969).
46. See, e.g., Ailsworth v. United States, 448 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1971) ; United States
v. Robinson, 439 F.2d 553, 562-63 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This reluctance was contrary to the de-
sires of then Attorney General Mitchell. See Stephens, The Burger Court: New Dimensions
in Criminal Justice, 60 Geo. L.. 249, 251 (1971).
47. Vigo Slip Opinion, supra note 1, at 5085.
48. Miss Pagan was a co-defendant in the prosecution and a co-respondent on the appeal.
49. United States v. Vigo, 357 F. Supp. 1360, 1365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The district court
430 [Vol. 42
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§ 3731 and the Second Circuit reversed, 50 ruling that Miranda was not applicable
to a situation where "[t]he statements were made immediately after Vigo's ar-
rest, at the scene of the arrest and before any systematic inquiry was begun by
the arresting agents." 51 The court found it unnecessary to rule on the constitu-
tionality or applicability of section 3501.52
The testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that Vigo's statements
were the result of a "discussion" between Vigo and the agent, following the par-
tial warning of rights.53 Neither the district court nor the court of appeals noted
this aspect of the context in which Vigo made his statements. The district court,
in applying the standards of Miranda,54 assumed without question that the state-
ments were the product of "custodial interrogation."135 Vigo had already been
arrested when he made the statements. "Discussion" would seem to involve more
than a statement made by the defendant; there would have to be active participa-
tion by the agent.56 Assuming that Vigo's statements were the result of "cus-
todial interrogation," Judge Motley had no difficulty finding the statements
inadmissible since the government did not meet the heavy burden imposed upon
it under Miranda.57
judge Motley also found the statements to be inadmissible under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501,58 since
given the absence of counsel, the failure of the agent to warn defendant that his
statement would be used against him and the absence of any evidence that defendant
otherwise knew the consequences of a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination,
the confession was not "voluntary" within the meaning of § 3501.59
It was this part of Judge Motley's decision suppressing Vigo's statements
also suppressed a statement made by miss Pagan since there was no evidence of a waiver,
id. at 1367, and evidence found during a search of Miss Pagan's purse was suppressed on a
finding that the arrest of Pagan was unlawful and there was no reason to believe that she was
armed or presently dangerous. Id. at 1365.
50. Vigo Slip Opinion. Judge Timbers dissented on the question of the admissibility of
Vigo's statements. Id. at 5088.
51. Id. at 5087. The government did not challenge the suppression of Pagan's statement
on appeal, but it did challenge the suppression of evidence seized from her pocketbook. The
court of appeals reversed in this regard, holding that "the search of Miss Pagan's purse was
reasonable and proper as a normal protective measure on the part of law enforcement
authorities." Id. at 5086.
52. Id. at 5088. But see id. at 5088-89 (Timbers, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
53. Transcript at 14, United States v. Vigo, 357 F. Supp. 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
54. See note 11 supra.
55. 384 U.S. at 444; see 357 F. Supp. at 1366.
56. Webster's Second International Dictionary 746 (1957) defines "discussion" as "argu-
ment for the sake of arriving at truth or clearing up difficulties." The difference between
"volunteered" statements and statements made in response to "interrogation" is considered
in Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Criminal Law and the Constitution-Sources and
Commentaries 351-60 (1968).
57. 357 F. Supp. at 1366. See also note 21 supra.
58. 357 F. Supp. at 1366-67; see notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
59. 357 F. Supp. at 1366-67 (footnote omitted).
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which the government attacked on appeal, relying exclusively upon section 3501
in seeking a reversal of that suppression. 0 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
completely avoided "the question of the application and constitutionality of §
3501."'' Relying upon the following language from Miranda, the appeals court
held that the circumstances of Vigo's statements were not meant to be subject to
the strict standards set forth in that decision: 62
"In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to
find all confessions inadmissible. . . Any statement given freely and voluntarily
without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. . . . Volun-
teered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their
admissibility is not affected by our holding today." 63
According to the Second Circuit panel, Vigo's statements were given voluntarily
under this section of Miranda.64
Is it possible to consider Vigo's statements to have been made "without any
compelling influences?" There would seem to be something inherently compelling
about an arrest,65 especially when a search of one's car has just turned up a quan-
tity of heroin. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Vigo began making
his statements without prompting by an agent.66 His was not the case of an
individual walking up to a police officer and making a confession. 7 It is true that
statements made at the time of arrest without warnings can be voluntary, 6 but
not when they are in response to questioning by an arresting agent.0 0 Courts also
60. Brief for Appellant at 6-15, United States v. Vigo, No. 73-1133 (2nd Cir., Sept. 11,
1973). Where the failure of an agent to warn a defendant that any statement made by the
defendant could be used against him in court would be conclusive against admissibility of
any statement made during in-custody interrogation without a clear waiver under Miranda,
384 U.S. at 476, the same is not true under section 3501(b). See text accompanying note
30 supra.
61. Vigo Slip Opinion 5088.
62. See note 11 supra.
63. Vigo Slip Opinion 5086-87, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
The court failed to note that Vigo's statements were made during a discussion with the agent.
64. Vigo Slip Opinion 5087.
65. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 515 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also
Driver 56-57.
66. The burden of proof on this issue is with the government. See Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Tafoya, 459 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1972); Stone v. United
States, 385 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968) ; Pitman v. United
States, 380 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1967). In these cases the statements in issue were not made
in response to questioning or "discussion" and were therefore admissible.
69. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Gonzales v. Beto, 425 F.2d 963, 971 (5th
Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 & 1001 (1970). In Miranda, the Supreme Court
said, "The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police Inter-
rogation while in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way." 384 U.S. at 477.
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have held that statements made in response to on-the-scene investigatory ques-
tioning by police officers need not be preceded by Miranda warnings. ° However,
once the suspect is in custody or deprived of freedom of action, questioning must
follow the warnings required by Miranda in order that statements made in re-
sponse be admissible.71
The court of appeals relied upon the following factors in ruling Vigo's state-
merits voluntary:
None of the inherently compelling factors of station-house interrogation were present.
The arresting agents did not coerce or deceive him. He was aware of the illegality
of his acts, and had in addition been given three of the four warnings required by
Miranda. He spoke in an effort to protect his companions, particularly liss Pagan,
and with evident knowledge of the meaning and consequences of what he said. Under
these circumstances, the admissibility of his statements was not precluded either by
the Fifth Amendment or by Miranda.72
This language is more a return to the totality-of-the-circumstances test which the
Supreme Court modified in Miranda" than a finding that Miranda did not re-
quire warnings in the Vigo situation.74 It was Judge Timbers who noted:
To hold Vigo's inculpatory statements to have been "voluntary" so that Miranda
warnings need not have been given, in effect is to return to the pre-Miranda test of
voluntariness and to validate, sub silentio, Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970)., ri
70. E.g., United States v. Barnes, 464 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 986 (1973); United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972); Lucas v. United
States, 408 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gibson, 392 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1968).
71. See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415,
419 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971) ; Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d
520, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969); Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d
545, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970); Morgan v. United States,
377 F.2d 507 (1st Cir. 1967). See also Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d S S (5th Cir. 1967) ;
United States v. Tchack, 296 F. Supp. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally 3 Wigmore, Evi-
dence § 826a (Chadboura rev. 1970).
72. Vigo Slip Opinion 5087 (footnote omitted). Following these statements the court
cited various cases where statements given in the absence of Miranda warnings were held to
have been voluntary. These cases are clearly distinguishable from Vigo since in none of
these cases had any warnings been given or, if the suspect was in custody, had any questions
been asked which in any way solicited the statements made. United States v. Tafoya, 450
F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1972); Sablowski v. United States, 403 F.2d 347 (loth Cir. 1965);
Parson v. United States, 387 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1968); Stone v. United States, 385 F.ad
713 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 966 (1968); Pitman v. United States, 380 F.2d
368 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Cruz, 265 F. Supp. 15 (W.D. Tem. 1967); People
v. Gant, 264 Cal. App. 2d 420, 70 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1968); Cameron v. State, 214 So. 2d
370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
73. 384 U.S. at 476. This voluntariness test, calling for a consideration of all the circum-
stances of the confession or statement, was similar to section 3501. See notes 7-8, 29-30
supra and accompanying text.
74. Cf. 384 U.S. at 478.
75. Vigo Slip Opinion 5088-89 (Timbers, J. concurring and dissenting in part).
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Since Judge Timbers felt that Vigo's statements were the result of custodial
interrogation," and inasmuch as one of the required Miranda warnings was not
given, 77 the only way that the statements could be found admissible would be
under section 3501.78 This seems to have been the government's view in pre-
paring its brief on appeal.79
V. ADmissrBraTY TODAY
Vigo is not the first case in which the Second Circuit has avoided a decision as
to the constitutionality and application of section 3501.80 Indeed, the Second
Circuit is not alone in its reluctance to confront those issues.8 ' While there are
limited circumstances in which it is proper for the court to sidestep constitutional
issues, 12 it is questionable whether the court in Vigo properly could avoid the
issue of the constitutionality of section 3501.83 If the courts continue to use sec-
tion 3501 in substance but not in name it will be only those courts' interpreta-
tions of Miranda which will be subject to review and not the substance of section
3501.84 The requirements of Miranda may fade away in time as the Supreme
76. Id. at 5090. Judge Timbers noted that the statements were made during a discussion
with the agent. Id. See text at note 53.
77. Vigo Slip Opinion 5087.
78. While Miranda held that the warning not given Vigo is required before Vigo's
statements are admissible, 384 U.S. at 476, section 3501 says that "[tlhe presence or absence
of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge [includ-
ing the warning not given Vigo] need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1970). See also note 60 and text accompanying note 30
supra.
79. See Brief for Appellant, United States v. Vigo, No. 73-1133 (2d Cir., Sept. 11, 1973);
note 60 supra and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct.
3069 (1973), where the court said, "The difficult question of whether section 3501 was
intended to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or whether it would be
constitutional if it was, is not presently before us and we express no opinion as to the
possible answers." Id. at 636 n.6 (parallel citations omitted).
In United States v. Marrero, 450 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933
(1972), then Chief Judge Friendly found it necessary in a concurring opinion to write:
"I assume that when the majority opinion says 'The admissibility of confessions in federal
criminal prosecutions is governed by § 3501 which must be read as a whole,' it does not
decide by implication on the serious issues whether that section, added by the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, 210, intended to overrule Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), or would be constitutional if it did." Id. at 379 (parallel
citations omitted).
81. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
82. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 34648 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
83. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
84. Were section 3501 to be held unconstitutional, a direct appeal to the Supreme Court
would be proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). Were the decision of the lower court to
uphold the validity of section 3501, review by the Supreme Court could be by certification
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(3) (1970). When the courts do not rely on section 3501 in consider-
ing a motion to suppress a statement made by an accused in custody in response to interro-
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Court continues to deny certiorari in cases where statements are held admissible
under Miranda by lower courts.8 5
In fact, a survey of several recent Second Circuit cases indicates that this
process is well under way.s8 In United States v. Vanterpool,87 the court provided
the foundation for many of the cases distinguishing Miranda when it stated that
"the words of Miranda do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be
repeated without variation in order to be effective. Words which convey the sub-
stance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient."88 This
opened the way for broader interpretation of warnings by the lower courts. In
United States v. Lamias9 the court followed its initiative in Vanterpool by hold-
ing that a warning that defendant "need not make any statement at this time"
complied with the "right to remain silent" warning required by MAfiranda. 0 The
Second Circuit, in turn, relied on its Lamia ruling, in United States v. Car-
neglia, ' to find that the omission of a specific warning of the right to counsel
during questioning did not invalidate the total warnings when defendant was told
both of his right to remain silent and of his right to appointed counsel-who
would be appointed if and when he went to court. There the court considered
evidence of subsequent conduct: the defendant, shortly after making his state-
ment, informed the agent that he wished to consult with counsel before answering
any more questions.
9 2
A strong indication that the initial strength of Miranda will be eroded con-
siderably with the acquiescence of the present Supreme Court is the opinion of
that Court by Chief Justice Burger in Harris v. New York.9 3 There, the Court
held that a statement- by the defendant, which was inadmissible against him
during the prosecution's direct case because of a lack of procedural safeguards
required under Miranda, could be used for impeachment purposes in attacking
gation, review is possible only if the Supreme Court grants certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 12S4(1)
(1970).
85. See, e.g., cases cited in note 86 infra.
86. See United States v. Carneglia, 468 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973); MAassimo v. United States, 463 F.2d 1171 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1117 (1973); United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 907
(1970).
87. 394 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1968).
88. Id. at 698-99.
89. 429 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 907 (1970).
90. Id. at 375-76. Taking this warning with the warning that he had a "right to an
attorney" and that one would be appointed for him if he could not afford one, the court
found an adequate warning that he need not make a statement until he had the advice of
an attorney. Id. at 376-77. The problem arises when the defendant thinks a statement is a
formal explanation or written statement. The Miranda Court explicitly required the "right
to remain silent" warning to protect against this misinterpretation. 384 U.S. at 467-68.
91. 468 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
92. In Miranda, the Supreme Court stated that "[nlo effective waiver of the right to
counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings
we here delineate have been given." 384 U.S. at 470.
93. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
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the credibility of the defendant's testimony at trial. Acknowledging that "[s] ome
comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use
of an uncounseled statement for any purpose . . ." the Court nevertheless deter-
mined that "discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's hold-
ing and cannot be regarded as controlling." 4 Justice Burger wrote: "The shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way
of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utter-
ances."
95
Recently, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,90 the Supreme Court dealt at length
with the question of voluntariness in the context of search and seizure. In re-
versing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that while the state must demonstrate
that consent to search was voluntarily given and not coerced, this "[v]olun-
tariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and
while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a pre-
requisite to establishing a voluntary consent."'97
The Court made it clear that this holding was limited to situations where the
subject of the search was not in custody.08 It specifically stated that "[t]he con-
siderations that informed the Court's holding in Miranda are simply inapplicable
94. Id. at 224. In Miranda, the Court said that "the prosecution may not use statements,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination." 384 U.S. at 444. The Court also said that "unless and until such
warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him [an individual in custody]." Id. at 479 (foot-
note omitted). At a third place the Court said that, "[tjhe warnings required and the waiver
necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective
equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant. No
distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions and statements
which amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an offense." Id. at 476.
95. 401 U.S. at 226. See also United States v. Baratta, 397 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 939 (1968), where the court allowed a statement which was inadmissible
because of a lack of Miranda warnings to be used to refresh the recollection of the defen-
dant on the witness stand when the statement was not identified, read, or otherwise
presented to the jury and where the defendant testified that his recollection was not re-
freshed. But see United States v. Jeffery, 473 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1973), where statements
inadmissible under Miranda were not received into evidnce at trial to contradict the defen-
dant's trial testimony.
For discussions of the Harris decision see Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 Yale
L.J. 1198 (1971); Kent, Harris v. New York: The Death Knell of Miranda and Walder?,
38 Brooklyn L. Rev. 357 (1971); Note, Impeachment By Unconstitutionally Obtained Evi-
dence: The Rule of Harris v. New York, 1971 Wash. U.L.Q. 441 (1971); 40 Fordham L.
Rev. 394 (1971).
96. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
97. Id. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at 248.
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in the present case." 99 The inherently coercive situation involved when the
techniques of police questioning are combined with the nature of custodial sur-
roundings are not present when there is a consent search involving someone not
in custody.100
The great lengths to which the Court went in distinguishing its Miranda hold-
ing from Schneckloth appear to give greater weight to the former. In fact, the
Court was careful not to rule out the possibility that warnings may be required
to prove voluntariness when the consent to search is given by one in custody.1 '
Of the five justices in the Miranda majority only Justices Douglas and Bren-
nan are still on the Court. Justices Stewart and White remain from the minority.
In Harris, Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented. Justice
Harlan was in the majority. Since Harris, Justices Black and Harlan have been
replaced on the Court by Justices Rehnquist and Powell. Of course, it is difficult
to say with any degree of certainty what the Court would do if presented with a
challenge to section 3501.102 It appears unlikely, though, that such an appeal
would be heard by the Court in the near future.'0 3 Presently, this is not the
crucial issue. Without a Supreme Court ruling, section 3501 has become influ-
ential.
Where a suspect is questioned contemporaneously with his arrest, the Second
Circuit's decision in Vigo has modified Miranda at least as extensively as section
3501. Both section 3501 and Vigo are the law. While section 3501 has never been
relied upon in deciding the admissibility of a statement given by a suspect during
in-custody interrogation, Vigo provides a facile decisional alternative. If the
Second Circuit trend continues, 0 4 Vigo will be a major influence upon the courts
when they consider statements given in similar circumstances. Unhappily, as
Judge Timbers wrote in his Vigo dissent:
Dissatisfaction with a controlling Supreme Court decision, however, does not warrant
judicial legislation. I am sure that my colleagues do not suggest it does. But their
application of Miranda to the facts of the instant case strikes me as coming perilously
close to frustrating the rationale of this controlling Supreme Court decision.' 0 5
Indeed, whether out of respect for the opinion of Congress expressed in the pas-
99. Id. at 246.
100. Id. at 247.
101. See id. at 240-41 n.29.
102. This is true, basically, because of the doctrine of stare decisis. It was out of respect
for stare decisis that Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's opinion in Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324 (1969), where it was held that Miranda warnings were required before
questioning a suspect who was in custody even when the interrogation was being conducted
in the suspect's bedroom. Id. at 327-28 (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. See text accompanying notes 80-84 supra. Many cases never reach the appeal stage.
The defendant, once the trial court has found a statement admissible, often chooses to plead
guilty to a part of the indictment in order to limit his exposure at sentencing. Such a plea
of guilty precludes any appeal of the ruling of admiss;hility. See United States v. Selby,
476 F.2d 965 (2d Cir. 1973).
104. See text accompanying notes 85-92 supra.
105. Vigo Slip Opinion 5092 (Timbers, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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sage of title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and
in the legislative history of that act,106 or for some other reason, the lower fed-
eral courts, while avoiding a direct ruling on the constitutionality of section
3501,107 have put its provisions to work in direct defiance of the Supreme Court's
decision in Miranda v. Arizona. In so doing they have virtually eliminated the
need for prosecutors to rely upon section 3501 and, as a result, the need to rule
on that statute's constitutionality.
Robert M. Levine
106. See Report, supra note 26.
107. See notes 80-81 supra.
